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Abstract
This paper investigates data of listed companies of 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2011-2013, and the result 
shows that listed companies received government R&D 
subsidies can get more external financing and the positive 
impact of the certification effect generated by receiving 
an R&D subsidy is stronger for equity financing than for 
debt financing. Furthermore, the effect is more significant 
in high-tech enterprises.
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INTRODUCTION 
To promote technology innovation, governments usually 
would give some R&D subsidies to enterprises. As 
governments R&D subsidies continued increasing in recent 
years, the effectiveness of the policy has got more and more 
attention. However, current researches in the field mainly 
focused on the effect of government R&D subsidies on 
enterprises’ R&D expenditure. Few studies concern its role 
in alleviating enterprises’ financing constraints. Therefore, 
analyzing the impact of public R&D funding on enterprises’ 
access to external financing will not only provide a 
better understanding of the role of public R&D funding 
plays in technology innovation, but also be beneficial for 
governments to make funding policy specifically.
To examine the impacts of government R&D subsidies 
on enterprises’ access to external financing, we are going to 
answer the following questions. (a) Do government R&D 
subsidies affect enterprises’ access to external financing? 
(b) Does external financing come from debt financing or 
equity financing? (c) Is the effect of government R&D 
subsidies more significant to high-tech enterprises? This 
paper investigates data of listed companies of Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange in 2011-2013, and the result shows that 
listed companies received government R&D subsidies can 
get more external financing, especially equity financing. 
Furthermore, the positive impact of the certification effect 
generated by receiving an R&D subsidy is more significant 
for high-tech enterprises.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 1 presents a brief literature review and puts 
forward our hypotheses. Section 2 provides a description 
of the model and sample used. The results of our study are 
presented in Section 3. The paper ends with conclusions. 
1 .   L I T E R AT U R E  R E V I E W  A N D 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
It is widely viewed that research and development 
activities are usually underinvested in a freely competitive 
market place because of market failure. Due to the 
technology spillover, private enterprises can not have 
all social benefit brought by high and new technology 
exclusively, which would make enterprises’ private cost 
higher than private benefit. So, enterprises have to reduce 
R&D investment (Arrow, 1962). One of the main policies 
to correct market failure is government subsidizing 
enterprises’ R&D activities directly. Government R&D 
99 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
LUO Wei; LI Hong (2015). 
Canadian Social Science, 11(11), 98-102
subsidies not only can reduce research cost and risk of 
enterprises, but also can shorten the gap between private 
benefits and social benefits of R&D activities. Then, R&D 
investment would become profitable, and enterprises 
are willing to expand R&D investment. There are a 
large number of literature found that government R&D 
subsidies indeed can effectively stimulate enterprises’ 
R&D expenditure (Lach, 2002; Zhang & Wu, 2014).
In addition, government R&D grants also play 
an important role in increasing enterprises’ access to 
external financing.
Enterprises’ R&D projects are generally faced with 
financing constraints (Harhoff, 1998). This is determined 
by the following characteristics of R&D investment. 
First, the information between entrepreneurs and 
external investors is asymmetrical. Generally speaking, 
entrepreneurs frequently have better information 
about the likelihood of success and expected returns 
of the innovation project than potential investors. But 
entrepreneurs are reluctant to reveal their innovative 
ideas to the marketplace and the fact that there could 
be a substantial cost to revealing information to their 
competitors reduces the quality of the signal they can 
make about a potential project. Therefore, the information 
on R&D projects disclosed by entrepreneur is often fuzzy 
(Anton & Yao, 1998). The marketplace for financing the 
R&D projects looks like the “lemons market” modeled by 
Akerlof (1970). The lemons’ premium for R&D will be 
higher than that for ordinary investment because investors 
are often lack of sufficient information to assess R&D 
projects when the projects are long-term R&D investments 
than when they are more short-term or low-risk projects 
(Leland & Pyle, 1977; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Although 
the enterprise accounting standards require listed 
companies to reveal information about R&D projects, but 
this can only reduce the degree of information asymmetry 
and can not completely eliminate the information 
asymmetry. Lemons’ premium still exists. Second, R&D 
staffs’ compensation accounts for a large proportion of 
R&D expenditure, which embedded in the human capital 
of the firm’s employees, and therefore lost if they leave 
or are fired. R&D project usually needs to experience a 
long period of time from idea to commercialization. This 
implies that R&D spending at the firm level typically 
behaves as though it has high adjustment costs (Lach 
& Schankerman, 1988). So, potential investors require 
quite high rate of return of R&D projects to cover the 
adjustment cost. In addition, because human capital can 
not be used for mortgage loans, enterprises lack of credit 
collateral to obtain bank loans, which undoubtedly further 
exacerbated financing constraints of enterprises.
Thus firms will be forced to use internal funds for 
R&D projects. Internal financing has several advantages: 
no need of collateral; no adverse selection problem; no 
enlarge financial crisis etc.. But if enterprises only rely 
on internal funds for R&D projects, they may encounter 
a lot of difficulties. Fist of all, funds needed to collect 
may exceed internal funds, creating a funding gap. This 
funding gap may prevent firms, especially for SMEs, 
from undertaking economically viable innovation 
projects. Second, R&D projects need sustaining fund 
supplies. However, firms’ profits may be volatile because 
of economy cycle, which implies internal funds can not 
satisfy this kind of fund demand.
So, it is important for innovation projects to obtain 
external funds. To increase enterprises’ access to external 
financing, the first thing to solve is to reduce information 
asymmetry between entrepreneurs and external investors. 
One feasible way is that external investors collect 
information through intermediaries, such as government 
agencies, industry associations and consulting agencies. 
Government grants indeed contain some important 
information. Enterprises must apply to the relevant 
government agency if they want to obtain government 
subsidies. Government agencies will collect information 
to review the feasibility of R&D projects and whether the 
enterprise has corresponding technical advantages after 
receiving the enterprise’s application. Generally speaking, 
the information collected by government agencies is much 
more and better. This is because government agencies, due 
to more experience with similar projects in the past, have a 
sound project review system. Lerner (1999) shows that due 
to more intensive analysis government agencies perform a 
significantly better screening and thus have an improved 
perception of the project’s focus and riskiness. Besides, 
because of the neutrality and confidentiality of government 
agencies, enterprises do not have to worry about innovation 
projects would be emulated by competitors when disclosed 
more information to government agencies. Therefore, 
applications of poor quality enterprises have been filtered 
out as much as possible through government agencies’ 
project review system. That means most projects obtained 
government subsidies are feasible and promising, and 
the enterprise also has the technical advantages that 
R&D projects required. So, government R&D subsidies 
could play an important role in certifying enterprises’ 
quality and technological merits of the enterprises’ 
projects (Lerner, 1999; Meuleman & Maeseneire, 
2012). External investors can distinguish enterprises’ 
quality according to whether the enterprise received 
government grants when they can not collect sufficient 
information to evaluate the enterprise. Government R&D 
subsidies can firm external investors’ confidence, thereby 
increasing enterprises’ access to external financing.
Based on the above argument, we put forward the 
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Receiving government R&D subsidies 
increases enterprises’ access to external financing.
Furthermore, the positive effect of government R&D 
subsidies may differ between debt and equity. Accord to 
peck order theories (Myers & Majluf, 1984), information 
asymmetry problem is most serious for equity. External 
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investors would require a considerable lemon’s premium 
when issuing equity. Therefore, the certification effect of 
government R&D subsidies may be the most significant 
for attracting equity. Lerner (1999) and Feldman and 
Kelley (2006) indeed find that R&D grants serve as a 
signal for good quality of SMEs that promotes attracting a 
particular source of new equity, namely venture capital.
Hypothesis 2a. The positive impact of the certification 
effect generated by receiving an R&D subsidy is stronger 
for equity financing than for debt financing.
On the other hand, it is known to all that venture 
capitalists, as specialized financial intermediaries, are good at 
collecting and processing information, and thus may alleviate 
information problems faced by R&D projects (Gompers 
& Lerner, 1999). However, it is much harder for banks to 
reduce information asymmetry. What makes the work of 
challenging is that it requires a profound understanding of 
how the firm and its markets operate. Giudici and Paleari 
(2000) pointed out that banks have limited competency 
in correctly evaluating high-tech enterprises’ innovation 
projects, leading to excessive collaterals required. Smaller 
firms suffer most from these problems. Based on these 
analyses, we put forward another hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2b. The positive impact of the certification 
effect generated by receiving an R&D subsidy is stronger 
for debt financing than for equity financing.
2.  DATA, MODEL AND METHODS
2.1  Data
This paper selects data of listed companies of the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2011-2013 as sample. 
Because Feldman and Kelley (2005) found that the 
positive impact of the certification effect generated by 
receiving an R&D subsidy is stronger for SMEs than 
large enterprises, while SMEs in China are mainly 
concentrated in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We filter 
the initial sample according to the following steps. (a) 
Eliminate companies listed after 2011. (b) Eliminate listed 
companies under special treatment, listed companies 
in financial industry, and listed companies that did 
not disclose information about government grants. (c) 
Eliminate extreme values triple standard difference 
method. Our final sample contains 1,129 listed companies, 
3,193 observations. The financial data of listed companies 
used in this paper are derived from the CSMAR database. 
We refer to annual reports of the listed companies to 
learn whether they received government R&D subsidies. 
The annual reports of the listed companies come from 
CNINF—the information disclosure website designated 
by the China Securities Regulatory Commission.
Government R&D subsidies are presented as “Non-
operating income” in the income statements or “specific 
accounts payable”, “other non-current liabilities” in 
the balance sheets. We process classification items for 
the three accounts, and judge whether the company has 
received government R&D subsidies.
2.2  Model and variables 
2.2.1  Model 
In order to examine the effect of the government R&D 
subsidies on companies’ debt financing or equity 
financing, this paper constructs the following model:
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2.2.2  Variables
Yi,t, the dependent variable, represent the financing of 
company i in year t. To distinguish between debt financing 
and equity financing, long-term debt financing and short-
term debt financing, it is divided into four forms: (a) 
Interest bearing debt financing (IBDi,t). It is equal to 
the sum of the increase value of short-term loans, non-
current liabilities due in a year, long-term loans, long-term 
accounts payable, and bonds payable in year t divided 
by the total assets at the beginning of year t; (b) External 
equity financing (EQUi,t). It is equal to the net increase 
value of equity in year t divided by the total assets at the 
beginning of year t. According to the definition of Baker 
(2003), the net increase value of equity equals the increase 
value of equity in book value minus the increase value 
of retained earnings; (c) Short-term interest bearing debt 
financing (SIBDi,t). It is equal to the sum of short-term 
loans and non-current liabilities due in a year divided 
by the total assets at the beginning of year t; (d) Long-
term interest bearing debt financing (LIBDi,t). It is equal 
to the sum of the increase value of long-term loans, 
long-term accounts payable, and bonds payable in year 
t divided by the total assets at the beginning of year t. 
GOVi,t, which represents government R&D subsidies, is 
a dummy variable. GOVi,t equals 1 if company i received 
a government R&D subsidy in year t, 0 otherwise. SGi,t 
represents sales revenue growth of company i in year t. 
SIZEi,t-1, which represents the size of company i, equals 
the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning 
of year t. SOEi,t represents the ownership property of 
company i in year t. SOEi,t equals 1 if the controlling 
shareholder of company i is the SASAC, state organs, 
local governments or state-owned enterprise, 0 otherwise. 
ROAi,t-1, LEVi,t-1, and LIQi,t-1 respectively represent the 
rate of return on total assets, the asset-liability ration, 
the liquidity ration of company i in year t-1; YEAR12 
and YEAR13 are used to control time differences. If the 
observation is in 2012, YEAR12 equals 1; if not, YEAR12 
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equals 0. If the observation is in 2013, YEAR13 equals 1; 
if not, YEAR13 equals 0. INDUSTRYi is industry dummy 
variables, used to control industry differences. According 
to Industry Classification Guidance of Listed Companies 
issued by the CSRC, the listed companies in the sample 
are classified into 40 industries. 
3.  RESULT AND ANALYSIS
3.1  Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Descriptive statistics of variables are presented in Table 1. 
In the 3,193 observations of the sample, 1,843 observations 
received government R&D subsides, accounting for 
57.7%. Mean of interest bearing debt financing, short-term 
interest bearing debt financing, long-term interest bearing 
debt financing and external equity financing respectively 
account for 4.1%, 14.0%, 1.5% and 6.2% of the total assets.
3.2  Result
The model analyzes the sample with the OLS methodof 
Eviews7.2 and the result are presented in Table 2. Column 
1 shows that the regression coefficient of GOVi,t is 0.015, 
accounting for 1.5% of the total assets. And it means that 
companies received government R&D subsidies obtain 
more 33 million interest bearing debt financing than those 
not received government R&D subsidies if the total assets 
equal to the mean value.
Column 2 shows that the regression coefficient of GOVi,t 
is significantly positive in model 2 (short-term interest 
bearing debt financing model), while column 3 shows that 
the regression coefficient of GOVi,t is not significant in 
model 3 (long-term interest bearing debt financing model). 
It is implied that the positive impact of the certification 
effect generated by receiving an R&D subsidy is stronger 
for short-term interest bearing debt financing than for long-
term interest bearing debt financing. This may be due to 
the characteristics of the innovative projects. As a result of 
the uncertainty, enormous amount of investment, and long 
payback period features, innovation project investment 
is very risky. Although government R&D subsidies have 
played a positive role in the quality certification, but 
external creditors, for prudent consideration, only willing to 
provide short-term loans.
Column 4 shows that the regression coefficient of 
GOVi,t is also significantly positive in model 4 (external 
equity financing model), which means receiving 
government R&D subsidies increase enterprises’ access 
to external equity financing. Companies received 
government R&D subsidies obtain more 44 million 
external equity financing if the total assets equal to the 
mean value.
Compared column 1 with column 4 in Table 2, we can 
see that the regression coefficient of GOVi,t in model 4 is 
bigger than that in model 1. It is imply that the positive 
impact of the certification effect generated by receiving 
an R&D subsidy is stronger for equity financing than for 
debt financing, supporting hypothesis 2a.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standarddeviation
IBDi,t 0.041 0.008 1.072 -0.562 0.112
SIBDi,t 0.140 0.099 1.260 0.000 0.152
LIBDi,t 0.015 0.000 0.633 -0.257 0.069
EQUi,t 0.062 0.002 3.186 -0.231 0.247
GOVi,t 0.577 1 1 0 0.494
SGi,t 0.190 0.133 8.202 -0.946 0.472
SIZEi,t-1 21.521 21.345 25.765 18.181 1.064
SOEi,t 0.337 0 1 0 0.473
ROAi,t-1 0.069 0.061 0.922 -0.421 0.059
LEVi,t-1 0.388 0.370 1.556 0.016 0.221
LIQi,t-1 3.328 1.918 21.970 0.061 3.577
Table 2
Government R&D Subsidies’ Effect on Enterprises’ 
Financing 
Variables IBD(1)
SIBD
(2)
LIBD
(3)
EQU
(4)
GOVi,t
0.015***
（3.301）
0.016***
（3.174）
0.003
（1.095）
0.020**
（2.059）
SGi,t
0.044***
（10.687）
0.024***
（5.539）
0.013***
（5.209）
0.050***
（5.769）
SIZEi,t-1
0.019***
（8.092）
0.001
（0.247）
0.009***
（6.333）
-0.082***
（-16.753）
SOEi,t
-0.020***
（-4.236）
-0.046***
（-9.170）
-0.003
（-0.965）
-0.015
（-1.564）
ROAi,t-1
-0.012
（-0.341）
-0.204***
（-5.544）
0.024
（1.129）
1.073***
（14.895）
LEVi,t-1
-0.048***
（-3.335）
0.415***
（26.862）
-0.029***
（-3.195）
0.304***
（10.046）
LIQi,t-1
-0.003***
（-4.380）
-0.002**
（-2.122）
-0.002***
（-3.956）
-0.004**
（-2.397）
Intercept -0.344***（-6.500）
-0.061
（-1.088）
-0.176***
（-5.311）
1.591***
（14.381）
Year Control Control Control Control
Industry Control Control Control Control
N 3193 3193 3193 3193
F statistic 6.965*** 51.047*** 4.424*** 15.104***
Adj. R2 0.082 0.429 0.049 0.175
Note. Figures in Table 2 present the regression coefficient; value 
in parentheses is the t-statistic regression coefficient, *, ** and *** 
respectively represent they are significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
on a statistical basis.
3.3  Further Analysis
To further analyze the positive impacts of government 
R&D subsidies on enterprises in different industries, we 
divide the sample into two groups-high-tech enterprises 
group and non high-tech enterprises group. There is no 
clear definition of high-tech industries in China so far, 
but high-tech industries include medicine and medical 
equipment manufacturing, aerospace manufacturing, 
computer and office equipment manufacturing, instruments 
manufacturing and electronics and communication 
equipment manufacturing, according to the regulations of 
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OECD. So we classify companies in these five industries 
into high-tech enterprises group, and the others into non 
high-tech enterprises group.
Table 4 presents the result. Column 1 and column 3 
show that the regression coefficients of GOVi,t are both 
significantly positive, but it is bigger in high-tech enterprises 
group than in non high-tech enterprises group. Column 
2 and column 4 show the same result, but significance 
of regression coefficients is decreased due to sample 
reduction. It is indicated that the positive impact of the 
certification effect generated by receiving an R&D subsidy 
exists both in high-tech enterprises and non high-tech 
enterprises, but is more significant in high-tech enterprises.
Table 3
The Effect of Government R&D Subsidy in Different 
Industries
Variables
High-tech enterprises 
group
Non high-tech enterprises 
group
IBD
(1)
EQU
(2)
IBD
(3)
EQU
(4)
GOVi,t
0.018***
（3.498）
0.019
（1.467）
0.013*
（1.806）
0.007
（0.579）
SGi,t
0.067***
（11.289）
0.076***
（5.153）
0.034***
（5.769）
0.036***
（3.552）
SIZEi,t-1
0.012***
（4.586）
-0.085***
（-12.808）
0.024***
（6.538）
-0.068***
（-10.719）
SOEi,t
-0.015***
（-2.699）
-0.020
（-1.444）
-0.024***
（-3.262）
0.000
（0.015）
ROAi,t-1
-0.072*
（-1.724）
1.514***
（14.519）
-0.017
（-0.321）
0.655***
（7.037）
LEVi,t-1
-0.031*
（-1.738）
0.442***
（10.000）
-0.048**
（-2.171）
0.167***
（4.380）
LIQi,t-1
-0.004***
（-4.385）
0.000
（0.073）
-0.002
（-1.185）
-0.006**
（-2.328）
Intercept -0.216***（-3.962）
1.637***
（12.103）
-0.440***
（-5.912）
1.450***
（11.255）
Year Control Control Control Control
N 1802 1802 1391 1391
F statistic 21.938*** 55.502*** 9.949*** 22.604***
Adj.R2 0.095 0.214 0.055 0.123
Note. Figures in Table 3 present the regression coefficient; value 
in parentheses is the t-statistic regression coefficient, *, ** and *** 
respectively represent they are significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
level on a statistical basis. 
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates data of listed companies of 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2011-2013, and the result 
shows that listed companies received government R&D 
subsidies can get more external financing and the positive 
impact of the certification effect generated by receiving 
an R&D subsidy is stronger for equity financing than for 
debt financing. Furthermore, the effect is more significant 
in high-tech enterprises.
The conclusions of this paper have important 
implications for government departments and enterprises 
management. Government R&D subsidies can not only 
reduce the cost of innovation, but also can increase 
enterprises’ access to external financing. The policy 
of providing R&D subsidies to promote technology 
innovation is effective in the background that capital 
market is imperfect. Besides, the conclusions indicate 
that governments should take full account of industry 
characteristics and scale when select target enterprises. For 
enterprises management, they should understand subsidy 
policies fully and duly, and could consider applying R&D 
subsidies when R&D project need financing. 
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